Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
3-2014

The Growing Public Domain in Medicine
Saurabh Vishnubhakat
Texas A&M University School of Law, sv10@law.tamu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Growing Public Domain in Medicine, 15 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 293
(2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/465

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

2014]

THE GROWING PUBLIC DOMAVININMEDICINE

293

THE COLUMBIA

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
LAW REVIEW
VOL. XV

STLR.ORG

SPRING

2014

ARTICLE
THE GROWING PUBLIC DOMAIN IN MEDICINE

Saurabh Vishnubhakat
This Article describes the growing public domain of inventions
associated with drugs and medicine, and geographies associatedwith identifiable
shifts in the balance of innovation that may be especiallyfavorableforpromoting
wider access to socially useful technologies. To do so, it departsfrom the largely
ex ante perspective that currently informs the intersectional debate regarding
human rights and patent rights and, instead, looks backward to inquire what
innovationsfrom past patents have already become publicly available in serice
of the human rights objective ofgreater access to technology. Ex post analysis of
this kind may help public and private institutions alike in identifying ccles of
innovation that sustainably deprioritize socially valuable technologies and leave
them freefor public use.
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INTRODUCTION

Current scholarly discussions of what the balance is, and
ought to be, between patent systems and human rights take a
largely ex ante view of whether, to what extent, and how these
regimes can and should be reconciled with each other. This is
particularly true in the context of health and medicine where
debates persist, for example, as to whether human rights principles
require the complete or partial abrogation of patent rights or the
two are compatible,I whether the appropriate forum for such
balancing is in domestic law or international law, and what the
scope of patent-eligible subject matter should be in order to ensure

the upstream integrity of basic research. 3
This Article diverges from such debates and examines, not
ex ante how patent rights can sufficiently foster future innovation in
accordance with principles of human rights, but ex post what
innovations from past patent bargains have already become
publicly available in service of the human rights objective of
greater access, particularly to health-related technologies. 4 Related
empirical research by the author has recently described

comprehensively the public domain of technologies that have
recently passed out of U.S. patent protection, and has examined
the technological, geographical, and procedural traits of these
newly public inventions as a basis for exploring the social value

1.
2.
3.
4.

See
See
See
See

infra § Three Views of the Relationship.
infra § The Proper Intersectional Forum.
infra § The Reach of Eligible Subject Matter.
infra § The Expired Patent Dataset.
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associated with their unfettered use.5 Further comparison of these
inventions to those newly patented during the same period reveals
ongoing changes in the balance of innovation in the United States
and abroad.6
Proceeding from this general empirical framework, more
detailed analysis of particular technology areas such as drugs and
medicine and of particular geographies shows patterns of patent
expiration and issuance and may help identify sources of
innovation that reliably produce new inventions and sufficiently
deprioritize recent inventions to lapse into the public domain.7
Part II of this Article surveys current scholarship at the
interface of human rights and patent rights and explains the ex
ante character of three illustrative debates at that interface. Part III
describes the Expired Patents dataset and examines in detail the
case of drugs and medical inventions as an ex post benefit of past
patent bargains. Part IV concludes with a discussion of follow-on
research.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PATENT RIGHTS: AN Ex ANTE DEBATE
At the intersection of human rights and patent rights lies a
literature rich in debate and persistent in calls for reform. Three
salient threads of debate within this literature address different
aspects of the intersection itself: the nature of the relationship
between human rights and patent law; the legal sphere in which
that relationship operates; and the practical boundaries of patent
doctrine that appropriately account for this relationship.
Importantly, all three proceed from an ex ante perspective.
A. Intersection of Human Rights and Patent Rights
First, to understand the nature of the relationship between
human rights and patent rights, it is helpful to consider the
tripartite typology proposed in a recent essay by Richard Gold.
Professor Gold identifies three dominant conceptions of the
relationship, which he calls the "subjugation" approach, the
"integrated" approach, and the "coexistence" approach.9
5.
6.
7.
8.

Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Expired Patents (forthcoming 2014).
Id.
See infra § The Case of Drugs and Medical Inventions.
E. Richard Gold, Patents and Human Rights: A Heterodox Analysis,
41 J.L. MED. & ETHics 185 (2013).
9.
Id. at 186.
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1. Three Views of the Relationship
The subjugation approach holds human rights law as
mutually exclusive-and superior in any conflict-to patent law. 10
Literature subscribing to this view, especially where public health is
concerned, has often employed the rhetoric of balance and
symmetry in curbing the scope of patent protections through
explicit means such as compulsory licensing11 as well as curbing
the exercise of patent rights through implicit means such as selfregulatory best practices in university licensing.1
By comparison, the integrated approach holds patent law
and other intellectual property regimes as themselves being species
of human rights. Given the orientation of human rights toward
natural law,14 literature subscribing to this view has tended to
10. Id. at 187; see also Benjamin Mason Meier, Employing Health Rights
for GlobalJustice:The Promise of Public Health in Response to the Insalubrious
Ramifications of Globalization, 39 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 711, 727-31 (2006)
(arguing that it is international intellectual property regimes "that often prevent
states from easily providing medications and treatments to their peoples."); cf
Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, The Progress of Rights: Human
Rights to Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAw & POL'Y 315 (1996)
(arguing that the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) reverses only through economic coercion the otherwise
subordinate value of intellectual property to the priorities of developing
economies).
11. Pier DeRoo, "PublicNon-Commercial Use" Compulsory Licensing for
PharmaceuticalDrugs in Government Health Care Programs,32 MIcH.J. INT'L
L. 347 (2011) (defending compulsory licensing as striking an "appropriate
balance" within the TRIPS framework); Siddartha Rao, Closing the Global Drug
Gap: A PragmaticApproach to the Access to Medicines Problem, 3 J. LEGAL
TECH. RISK MGMT. 1 (2008) (defending compulsory licensing under a
framework of adequate remuneration that preserves the "delicate balance"
between innovation and access).
12. Amy Kapczynski, et. al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An
Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.
1031 (2005) (proposing a commons-based model of production and coordination
"that treat[s] all actors symmetrically vis- -vis the resource in question.").
13. Gold, supra note 8, at 187-88. The human rights charter often cited as
being amenable to incorporating intellectual property rights is the International
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, whose Article 15(1)
entitles a person to "the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author." A comparable
entitlement arises from Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
14. See, e.g., Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and
the Politics of Food, 49 STAN. J. INT'L L. 101, 140 (rejecting the creation of
markets for land as a commodity due to the tolerance in such markets for
violations of human rights that are-by definition, the author argues-
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define patent rights, not as a utilitarian balance between present
innovation and future access upon which human rights may act as
a supervening force, 1 but rather a priori in terms of human rights
principles such as human dignity and personhood as well as
morality.
Not least, the coexistence approach holds more divergently
still that patent rights are neither inferior to, nor a species of,
human rights, but rather that the two are separate and distinct
bodies of law that advance the same foundational goal: 18 "defining
the appropriate scope of private monopoly power that gives
authors and inventors a sufficient incentive to create and innovate,
while ensuring that the consuming public has adequate access to
the fruits of their efforts."1 9

deontologically inviolable); Frank Garcia, Trading Away the Human Rights
Principle,29 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 51, 87 (1999) (equating international trade with a
utilitarian approach and human rights with a deontological approach to forming
value judgments about globalization).
15. Cf Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where is the
Paradox?,in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX 72, 74

(Willem Grosheide, ed., 2010) (characterizing the traditional conception of
intellectual property as utilitarian and the modern human rights conception as
being capable of thwarting that utilitarian mechanism for impeding free riders in
order to foster innovation).
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual Property's Negative
Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 456-57 (2013)
(defining and defending intellectual property under personality theory as a
means for exercising "a fundamental right to oneself' inasmuch as the products
of one's creative labor are "a manifestation of that self'); see alsoJustin Hughes,
The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330-65 (1988)
(discussing more generally the personhood theory of intellectual property law).
17. See Laura A. Keay, Morality's Move Within U.S. Patent Law: From
Moral Utility to Subject Matter, 40 AIPLA QJ. 409 (2012) (describing a recent
reemergence in U.S. patent law of the moral utility doctrine as a result of ethical
debates surrounding biotechnologies such as human-animal chimeras and
genetic diagnostics); Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later:
Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003)
(arguing for just such a revival of the moral utility doctrine); see also Eur. Pat.
Convention [EPC], Convention on the Grant of European Patents Art. 53(a),
Oct. 5, 1973, as amended by EPC, Decision of the Administration Council of
the European Patent Organization, 13 I.L.M. 268, 286 (Dec. 21, 1978) (excluding
from patent protection those inventions "the publication or exploitation of which
would be contrary to 'ordre public' or morality").
18. Gold, supra note 8, at 188-89.
19. Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights And Intellectual Property: Conflict
Or Coexistence?,5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 48 (2003).
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Notably, whereas the subjugation approach and integrated
approach both regard human rights as a deontological privilege
while differing on that legal regime's superiority over
quintessentially utilitarian patent rights, Professor Helfer's
articulation of the coexistence approach appears to view human
rights law itself as a utilitarian balance between incentivization of
innovation and surety of access.
2. The Proper Intersectional Forum
Second, the mutual orientation of human rights and patent
rights thus understood, there is also debate regarding whether the
appropriate forum for such balancing is in international law20 or
domestic law, though the weight of the literature rests largely with
the former. Professor Gold's framework points cogently to the
latter, arguing that the subjugation and integrated approaches
require comparing two incommensurable normative frameworkshuman rights being a moral and deontological legal order, and
patent rights being an instrumental and utilitarian one.
Accordingly, only the coexistence approach may "respect
the different [normative] spheres in which human rights and
patents operate," and it is only through domestic law that patent
rights may sufficiently mediate the nation-specific complexities of
innovation and economic welfare. To be sure, it is not a failing of
the coexistence approach that international law is an inappropriate
forum for evaluating patent doctrine. To the contrary, patent law
20. See, e.g., Laura Pedraza-Farifia, Conceptions of Civil Society in
International Lawmaking and Implementation: A Theoretical Framework, 34
MICH.J. INT'L L. 605, 660-61 n.242, 667-68 n.271 (2013) (describing as "robust"
the law of human rights qua international law because it seeks to supplant the
role of sovereign governments in regulating state conduct); see also Holger
Hestermeyer, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND

ACCESS TO MEDICINES 76-136 (2007) (characterizing access to medicine ab initio
as a human right under international law).
21. See, e.g., Chuan-feng Wu, Raising the Right to Health Concerns
Within the Framework of International Intellectual Property Law, 5 ASIAN J.
WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 141, 163 (2010) (arguing that States must still
consider human rights concerns while drafting and implementing domestic
patent laws); cf Robert Danay, Copyright vs. Free Expression: The Case of
Peer-to-PeerFile-Sharingof Music in the United Kingdom, 8 YALEJ. L. & TECH.
2 (2006) (discussing the domestically incorporated international guarantee of free
expression set forth in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and its protection under British copyright law).
22. Gold, supra note 8, at 189-90.
23. Id. at 193.
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currently suffers from "artificial constraints imposed by the
problem quite
of the discourse" 2 4-a
internationalization
independent of the approaches involved. The coexistence
approach merely has the distinct virtue of being able to
accommodate a desirable return to "domestic dialogues, within
and proper to patent law." 25
3. The Reach of Eligible Subject Matter
Third, as to what the scope of patent-eligible subject matter
should be, Gold argues that the desirability of a domestic-law
conception for defining the reach of patents requires a coexistence
approach.2 6 Certainly to the extent that current literature casts the
incentive of patent rights largely in utilitarian terms, Gold argues
persuasively that recasting patent law to accommodate broader
normative principles-deontological principles-is consistent with
treating human rights as international law. However, it is only the a
priori definition of human rights as international that drives its
supposed inconsistency with patent rights under an integrated
approach. The development of a robust domestic dimension in
human rights may equally enable a reconception of patent law as a
species of human rights, building on the existing deontological
discourse in patent doctrine and intellectual property doctrine
28
more generally.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (advocating that general distributional norms embodied in the law
should be considered when determining the scope of patent rights).
27. Id. at 191-92 ("While domestic human rights laws-whether
constitutionalized or otherwise-may have something to say about domestic
patent laws, these have not been central to the debate.").
28. Supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; see also WendyJ. Gordon,
A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE LJ. 1533, 1540-83 (1993) (proceeding
from a Lockean labor-desert theory that patents should reward the labor
expended or the value added to society); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and
Copyrights Morally Justifled? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal
Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817 (1990) (proceeding from a Hegelian
actualization theory that a creative work is an extension of the creator's
personality and thus may properly be protected from appropriation); Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (similarly
arguing from a Hegelian perspective that achieving self-development as a person
requires a measure of control over external resources and that property rights
assure such control). But see William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of
User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1446-55 (critiquing various
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B. Implications of an Ex Ante Perspective
For all that these debates reflect a diverse literature on the
relationship between human rights and patent rights, they are all
nevertheless alike in that they take a largely ex ante view of how
that relationship should be operationalized.
As forward-looking proposals for reform, all three
approaches-subjugation, integrated, and coexistence-by their own
terms make ex ante assessments of how best to reconcile human
rights principles with patent law principles. More than any other,
however, the coexistence approach with its utilitarian balance takes
an ex ante orientation. As with the three approaches for balancing
human rights with patent rights, the choice of domestic or
international law is an ex ante debate about the most effective
forum in which to do the balancing and achieve the greatest
economic welfare rewards going forward. Finally, the debate over
eligible subject matter is cast almost entirely in terms of utilitarian,
ex ante incentives for innovation.
One important dimension of these relationships is the view
of human rights principles as a dispositive check on the reach of
patent rights through the use of mechanisms such as compulsory
licensing. In this interaction, a common opposing argument is that,
despite the relatively immediate potential for wider access,
compulsory licensing will harm research and development,
foreign direct investment, and technology commercialization in
deontological rationales for intellectual property protection, traditionally invoked
in defense of producers, as applied to user-innovators).
29. DeRoo, supra note 11, at 393-94 (favoring compulsory licensing
"despite the damaging impact it may have on the economic returns of
pharmaceutical R&D"); see also Susan Vastano Vaughan, Compulsory Licensing
of Pharmaceuticals Under Trips: What Standard of Compensation?, 25
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 101 (finding persuasive, though not
categorically unassailable, arguments "that the availability of compulsory
licensing impedes local research and development").
30. See, e.g., Aileen M. McGill, Compulsory Licensing of Patented
Pharmaceuticals: Why A WTO Administrative Body Should Determine What
Constitutes a Public Health Crisis Under The Doha Declaration, 10 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69, 90-92 (2009) (recounting significant declines in
foreign direct investment in response to the issuance of compulsory licenses for
pharmaceuticals in Thailand and Egypt).
31. Cf Lori Pressman, DNA Patent Licensing Under Two Policy
Frameworks: Implications for Patient Access to Clinical Diagnostic Genomic
Tests and Licensing Practice in the Not-for-Profit Sector, 6 LIFE SCl. & INDUSTRY
REP. 329 (2012) (finding across some 2600 academic institution-owned "DNA
patents" and some 700 NIH-administered "DNA patents"-patents referring to
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the medium to long term. To each of these points, scholars have
also counter-argued that the perceived harm is less severe than a
prioribeliefs suggest, as in the case of research and development
and foreign direct investment,3 3 and even that the actual effect of
compulsory licensing may be salutary, as in the case of
commercialization. 34 Beyond public health, similar debate has
proceeded in the context of climate change and green
technology.
Thus framed as a consequentialist discussion of the
negative and positive impacts upon incentives of various human
rights-driven proposals, this debate is concerned very much ex
ante with how best to balance the competing interests at work in

nucleotides in the claim language-that exclusivity in licensing tended to operate
as a greater incentive for faster commercialization).
32. See Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does
the Compulsory Licensing of PharmaceuticalsHurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. LJ. 853, 885-92 (2003) (illustrating through six case studies that
compulsory licenses issued predictably in significant pharmaceutical markets are
likely to harm innovation, but that compulsory licensing is not per se harmful to
innovation).
33. See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory
Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective BargainingApproach, 45
AM. Bus. LJ. 283, 285-96, 297-317 (2008) (discussing the general inverse
correlation between the use of compulsory licensing to weaken intellectual
property rights and the magnitude of foreign direct investment, specifically in the
context of public health-but clarifying sector-specific traits of firms and
macroeconomic traits of nations that are correlated with meaningful changes in
FDI).
34. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REv. 341,
380-88 (2010) (advocating compulsory licensing, together with a stricter standard
of patent enablement, a shorter patent term, and the use of innovation prizes, as
a means to "significantly diminish incentives to engage in costly and risky ex
post commercialization efforts"). Indeed, it is frequently a failure by the patentee
to commercialize its invention that provokes calls for compulsory licensing. See
Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public InterestAs a Deterrent
to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 43449 (2002)
(discussing the problem of patent nonuse and advocating compulsory licensing
as a remedy to foster greater commercialization in the public interest).
35. Compare Robert Fair, Does Climate Change justify Compulsory
Licensing of Green Technology, 6 B.Y.U. INT'L L. & MGMT. REv. 21, 26-29, 37
(2009) (expressing concern for loss of FDI from compulsory licensing), with
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA.J.L. & TECH.
301, 354-56 (2011) (expressing optimism for the more tailored use of march-in
rights rather than compulsory licenses notwithstanding the effect of normative
policy signals regarding the general desirability of expropriating technology for
public use).
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order to foster further innovation, if only as a future source of
expropriable assets.
The same is true for debates over which forum is better
suited for resolving conflicts between human rights and patents,
conflicts in which localized economic and social interests may be
oversimplified at the international level and so may be better
mediated through domestic patent laws or, conversely, conflicts
in which domestic patent laws may be too narrow and inadequate
in scope to support a desirable vindication of human rights
objectives.3 7
So also for determining the normatively appropriate
boundaries of patent subject matter eligibility, where the threat of
an anticommons characterized by overly fragmented, mutually
blocking private rights may result in the under-utilization of socially
valuable resources.38 Conversely, the anticommons argument for
diminished patent protection has been disputed as being based on
a threat that is overstated both theoretically and empirically.40
36.

Gold, supra note 8, at 192; Wu, supra note 21 and accompanying text;

see also HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF
PATENTS

AND

ACCESS TO

MEDICINES

158

(2007)

(noting the

ability of

pharmaceutical firms and other patent owners to vindicate their rights in
national and regional courts even though such rights be derived from regional
human rights treaties, some of which identify intellectual property as a generally
protected right), cited in Aaron Scheinwald, Who Could Possibly Be Against a
Treaty for the Blind?, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 445, 494
n.209 (2012).
37. See, e.g., Kelley A. Friedgen, Rethinking the Struggle Between Health
& Intellectual Property: A Proposed Framework for Dynamic, Rather Than
Absolute, Patent Protection of Essential Medicines, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 689
(2002) (arguing for limited, so-called "dynamic patent protections" that are
undefined in their diminished expectation of reward, but explicitly international
in their origin and implementation).
38. The seminal critique of intellectual property protection through an
anticommons lens is Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698,
698-99 (1998). For a conceptual discussion of the so-called "tragedy of the
anticommons" in property rights, see generally Michael A. Heller, The
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE LJ. 1163, 1166-67 (1999). A related
debate has also arisen as to the tension between respecting indigenous
knowledge as a form of intellectual property and respecting biodiversity as a
human rights objective. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property,
Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in InternationalLaw Posed by the
Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6
IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59 (1998).

39. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a
Biomedical Anticommons?, 27 REGULATION 54 (2004) (disputing Professors
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Both debates, again framed as consequentialist discourses
of the negative and positive impacts upon future economic welfare,
are concerned ex ante with how best to design systems for
reconciling human rights and patent rights concerns in the proper
forum and therein to set the proper doctrinal boundaries of patent
law. Indeed, the very framing of human rights as a claim of present
access in opposition to patent rights as an incentive for future
innovation leads naturally to a forward-looking discourse.
These ex ante debates about how to shape the patent
system going forward are both appropriate and useful for
informing public policy, particularly as academic and government
research takes an increasingly empirical focus. They are ultimately
incomplete, however, without evaluating in some detail the results
of past policies, evaluation that requires an ex post view.
III. LOOKING BACKWARD INSTEAD

Specifically, taking an ex post view of the patent bargain
inquires what society has gained with respect to technologies that
were previously accorded exclusionary protection in exchange for
the expectation that access to such technologies would eventually
flow into the public domain. The ex post perspective is analytically
consonant with concerns of fairness and a deontological approach
to evaluating outcomes,41 just as human rights principles are.42

Heller and Eisenberg's comparison of patents to government permits and of
patent-enabled thickets to individual blockades of different segments along a
river); Edmund W. Kitch, Comment on the Tragedy of the Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 50 ADVANCES IN GENETICS 271 (2003) (criticizing
Professors Heller and Eisenberg's expectation that over issuance of patents on
basic research technologies should hamper upstream innovation).
40. See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to
Academic Biomedical Research, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 131 (Adam P. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds., 2007) (finding that
biomedical research and development projects are interrupted for a variety of
reasons such as competitive concerns (29%), lack of time (60%), and, most of all,
lack of funding (62%)-but rarely because of patent concerns (1%)).
41. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV. 961, 1005-11 (2001) (articulating-in critique-the
"meaning, nonconsequentialist nature, and ex post character" of fairness
concerns).
42. See, e.g., Benoit Mayer, Climate Change and InternationalLaw in the
Grim Days, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 947, 961-62 (2013) (referring to "human rights'
deontological roots."); Timothy K. Kuhner, The Democracy to Which We Are
Entitled: Human Rights and the Problem of Money in Politics, 26 HARV. HUM.
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Accordingly, looking backward at patents that have expired into
public use is a potentially powerful and analytically consistent
means for determining what once-privately valuable inventions
may now be placed in service of the human rights objective of
greater access, particularly to health-related technologies. Empirical
analysis of this kind is possible using the forthcoming Expired
Patents Dataset.
A.

The Expired Patent Dataset

More fully described elsewhere, 43 the Expired Patents
Dataset describes lapses of patents into the public domain, for
failure to pay statutory patent maintenance fees, 44 during the recent
five-year period beginning January 1, 2008, and ending December
31, 2012. By merging patent maintenance fee data with patent
bibliographic information and further matching patent class
information with the familiar HallJaffe-Trajtenberg aggregate
technology category and subcategory system, 45 the full dataset
comprises the following original and constructed variables:
Original Variables
* patent number;
* patent application filing date;
* patent issuance date;
* patent technology class;
* patent technology subclass;
* inventor name;
* inventor city (for domestic inventors);
* inventor state (for domestic inventors);

RTS. J. 39, 88 (2013) (similarly referring to "human rights law's deontological
emphasis on human dignity").
43. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 5.
44. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2013). All patents that issue from applications filed
on or after December 12, 1980, are subject to three maintenance fees
respectively payable 3.5 years, 7.5 years, and 11.5 years from the date of
issuance and each with a 6-month grace period. Failure to pay these
maintenance fees results in the expiration of the patent at the end of the grace
period: 4, 8, or 12 years from issuance, respectively.
45. See generally Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent CitationsData
File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001). The category and subcategory
definitions as well as the concordance are available at www.nber.org/patents.
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*

inventor zip code (for domestic inventors,
available);
* country code46 (for foreign inventors);
* dates of all maintenance events; and
* event codes describing all maintenance events. 47
Constructed Variables
* patent age at expiration;
* HallJaffe-Trajtenberg technology category; and
* HallJaffe-Trajtenberg technology subcategory.

if

B. The Case ofDrugs and Medical Inventions
In addition to the rich economic and legal literature on
innovation in the pharmaceutical and medical fields generally, the
present study relies in particular on the economic assumptions of
the "Drugs and Medical" category of inventions as formally
defined.48 Thus, for example, the HallJaffe-Trajtenberg analysis
found that patents on "Drugs and Medical" inventions together
with those on "Computers and Communications" and "Electrical
and Electronic" inventions have risen in their share of total patents,
and the traditional fields of "Chemical," "Mechanical," and
"Other" inventions have declined in relative share-reflecting a shift
toward high technology in economic importance.49 Moreover,
"Drugs and Medical" patents have tended to receive far more
subsequent citations than they have made to their own prior art,
though it is not clear whether this trend reflects greater
technological originality or is simply artifactual. Related trends in
self-citation-the practice of a firm citing in one patent to another,
earlier patent that it also holds-show much greater self-citation
among "Drugs and Medical" patents, consistent with the tendency
of innovation in that field to be more concentrated in large firms

46. For documentation explaining the country codes, see Patent Full-Text
and
Image
Database,
USPTO,
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/VFO/help/helpctry.htm
(last updated Dec. 6,
2005).
47. For documentation explaining the maintenance event codes, see
UNITED

STATES PATENT

MAINTENANCE

FEE

AND TRADEMVARK

EVENTS

FILE

5

OFFICE, U.S.
tbl.

2

(2009),

PATENT GRANT
available

storage.googleapis.com/patents/maint-fee-events/currenvMaintFeeEventsFileDoc
umentation.doc.
48. See Hall et al., supra note 45.
49. Id. at 13-14.
50. Id. at 16.

at
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with a greater likelihood of internal citation. Finally, these and
other trends across technology categories and subcategories are
markedly heterogeneous for patents within the "Drugs and
Medical" category, suggesting that inventions within the "Drugs,"
"Surgery and Medical Instruments," "Biotechnology," and
"Miscellaneous" subcategories reflect economically meaningful
differences in how they are developed, protected, commercialized,
and disseminated.
By way of context for the case study of "Drugs and
Medical" patents, then, descriptive statistics for the Expired Patents
Dataset focused on two dimensions: technologies of inventions and
geographies of inventors. Segmented by technology, the mean
expiration age of patents ranged from 7.5 years to 9 years as shown
in Figure 1. Among expiring cohorts, "Chemical" and "Drugs and
Medical" patents were the oldest at expiration. Figure 2 revisualizes
these trends using the mean patent age of each monthly expiration
cohort to estimate the mean month in which that cohort of patents
issued.
Segmentation by geography revealed that, across U.S.
states, the mean expiration age of patents ranged from 6.5 years to
9.5 years as shown in Figure 3. Patents from Idaho and Vermont
were consistently the youngest; those from Iowa and New
Hampshire, largely the oldest. Figure 4 revisualizes these trends
using the mean patent age of each monthly expiration cohort to
estimate the mean month in which that cohort of patents issued.
Similarly, across foreign countries, 54 the mean expiration
age of patents ranged from 4 years to 10 years as shown in Figure
5, and Figure 6 revisualizes these trends using the mean patent age
of each monthly expiration cohort to estimate the mean month in
which that cohort of patents issued. Cross-segmentation by both
geography and technology shows in Figure 7 the number of
expired patents per HallJaffe-Trajtenberg technology category in
each foreign country, and Figure 8 shows the percentage share of
51. Id. at 19-20.
52. Id. at 23.
53. Vishnubhakat, supra note 5. Inventor "geographies" refer to the city,
state, country, or other geographic unit of record associated with inventors
named on a given patent. The present study looks at the first-named inventor, as
is common practice in the relevant economic literature. Thus, for example, the
analysis may attribute U.S. patents toJapan as shorthand for U.S. patents whose
first-named inventors listJapan as their country of record.
54. This analysis looked at all foreign countries with U.S. patents expiring
during the 2008-2012 period.
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each foreign country's patent expirations across the HalljaffeTrajtenberg technology categories. Figures 9 and 10 likewise show,
respectively, the number of granted patents per HallJaffeTrajtenberg technology category in each foreign country and the
percentage share of each foreign country's patent grants across the
HallJaffe-Trajtenberg technology categories.
These findings enable direct comparison, therefore, of
inventions entering the domain of patent protection and those
leaving it for the public domain. Figures 11 and 12 show this
comparison for foreign countries in decreasing order by
expirations and grants, respectively. The descending order of
patent expirations across foreign countries in Figure 11 would
suggest that commensurate rates of patent grant would reveal a
monotonically decreasing distribution from left to right across the
same countries.5 5 This is not the case, however, as a number of
countries accounted for patent grants markedly higher than their
incidences of patent expiration. So also in Figure 12, ordered
descending by patent grants, where a number of countries
conversely accounted for patent expirations markedly higher than
their incidences of patent granting.
These findings also show in particular that patents on
"Drugs and Medical" inventions both expire and issue at a higher
and more variable proportion as the total count of patent
expirations and grants decreases across foreign countries. Put
another way, among countries whose inventors patent extensively
in the United States, "Drugs and Medical" inventions are
consistently a small minority-indeed, they are far eclipsed by
patented inventions in the "Electrical" and "Computer and
Communications" arts. This inverse relationship, between total
patent expirations and grants on the one hand and "Drugs and
Medical" patent expirations and grants on the other, suggests that
an optimal middle ground may exist that balances the scale of
overall patenting activity with the particular proportion of "Drugs
and Medical" patenting. Because each diminishes as the other
rises, the middle ground of interest is characterized by sufficiently
high overall patenting activity as well as sufficiently high
proportional importance given to the development, knowledge
dissemination by patenting, and expiration into public use of
"Drugs and Medical" technologies.

55. In simple terms, a monotonic function is one that is everywhere
increasing or everywhere decreasing, i.e., where a < b, f(a) < f(b), and vice-versa.
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To determine this optimal middle, one may consider a
country's throughput of patented technology into the public
domain by its expired patents as a proportion of its newly granted
patents over the same time period. By comparing this throughput
statistic against the total patent grant activity for that country, it is
possible to optimize both quantities independently.
Thus, as Figure 13 shows in a log-log
comparison,
approximately half of the countries examined received fewer than
100 total patent grants during the entire period of 2008-2012, falling
to the left of 2 on the logarithmic abscissa axis. Moreover, a
significant majority of countries also experienced more total
expirations than total grants during the entire period of 2008-2012,
falling below 0 on the logarithmic ordinate axis. By comparison
to total expirations and grants, however, throughput ratios for
"Drugs and Medical" patents represent a slightly more clustered
range of grant activity over the entire period of 2008-2012. More
importantly, these patents all fall on or below 0 on the ordinate
axis, meaning that expirations never outpaced new grants among
such inventions in any country during 2008-2012.
Taking from this distribution those countries which, during
2008-2012, received approximately 1000 patents or more (thus
having abscissa values of approximately 3 or higher) and expired
approximately half or more of their existing patents (thus having
ordinate values of approximately -0.3 or higher) reveals four
countries of particular interest: the United Kingdom, France,
Sweden, and Canada. By the patent throughput analysis described,
these countries are potentially sustainable sources both of ongoing
innovation as measured by total U.S. patenting activity and of
public domain technology as measured by a high fraction of patent
expiration.
The identification
of these countries
and their
characterization and comparison in terms of an ex post analysis,
however, are instrumental conclusions rather than causal or
56. A log-log analysis transforms both axes into their logarithmic
equivalents in order to compare exponential phenomena in a linear fashion.
2
57. An abscissa value of 2 corresponds to 10 , or 100, patent grants. This
analysis refers to "abscissa" and "ordinate" axes rather than independent and
dependent axes, respectively, to avoid suggesting causal relationships that are
beyond the scope of this descriptive analysis.
58. An ordinate value of 0 corresponds to an expiration/grant ratio of 100
or 1, indicating a steady state of patent turnover. Positive ordinate values
indicate that more patents expired than were granted, and negative ordinate
values indicate that fewer patents expired than were granted.
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mechanistic ones and invite further study of two issues. One line of
inquiry is into the economic drivers that impel inventors from these
countries both to continue investing, inventing, and patenting in
the United States and to allow a substantial portion of their patents
to expire for non-maintenance. The other line of inquiry is into
whether and how the drugs and medical technologies taught by
expired patents are actually being practiced more widely to the
benefit of the public.
IV. NEXT STEPS
More broadly, the analytical and empirical ex post inquiry
set forth in this Article has described the value of looking
backward to assess the public inheritance of technologies for which
U.S. patent protection was previously granted, and has identified a
geographic cluster of countries that may exhibit a cycle of
innovation that sustainably deprioritizes socially valuable
pharmaceutical and medical inventions and leaves them free for
public use.
As a proof of principle, this Article therefore invites more
detailed analysis along a number of dimensions. One such
dimension is the technology sector itself, viz., disaggregating the
"Drug and Medical" category into subcategories to characterize
with more precision the inventions that have become publicly
available in recent years. Another, more sophisticated thread for
follow-on research is not to select the threshold parameters of
patent grant activity and expiration proportion ab initio, but to
estimate them econometrically. Ultimately, it is hoped that these
and other empirical inputs will encourage a greater
understanding-and, if appropriate, deliberate development-of
innovation equilibria with a sustainable output of socially valuable
technologies available for public use.
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V. TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 1. Mean Age of Expiring Patents by Technology Category
(2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 2. Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents by Technology
Categorv (2008-2012) (six-month moving averae)
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Figure 3. Mean Age of Expiring Patents by U.S. State
(2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 4. Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents by U.S. State
(2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
CA
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Figure 5. Mean Age of Expiring Patents by Foreign Country
(2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 6. Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents by Foreign
Country (2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 7. Patent Expirations by Foreign Country Across
Technology Categories (2008-2012)
(six-month moving average)

Patent Expirations by Foreign Country Across Technology Categories (2008-2012)
250,000

200,000
0

150,000

100,000

50,000

0

Foreign Country
Chemical

Cmp&Cmm

Drgs&Med

Elec

M~ech

'MOthers

2014]

THE GROWING PUBLIC DOMAININMEDICINE

317

Figure 8. Patent Expirations by Foreign Country Across
Technology Categories (2008-2012)
(six-month moving average)
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Figure 9. Patent Grants by Foreign Country Across Technology
Categories (2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 10. Patent Grants by Foreign Country Across Technology
Categories (2008-2012)
(six-month moving average)
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Figure 11. Patent Grants and Expirations Across
Foreign Countries (2008-2012)
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Figure 12. Patent Grants and Expirations Across Foreign Countries
(2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 13. Patent Throughput of Expirations and Grants Across

Foreign Countries (2008-2012) (log-log)
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